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 Abstract  
Under the basic assumption that national climate change risk and vulnerability are 
closely linked with a country’s resilience to climate change, we analysed how some 
aspects of culture are related to risk and vulnerability. Individualism/collectivism, 
religiousness and cultural heterogeneity are the cultural aspects analysed. Variables 
quantifying those aspects of culture were consistently correlated with standard risk and 
vulnerability measures. Further inquiry revealed that religiousness, and to a lesser 
extent cultural heterogeneity, can contribute to explaining national differences in 
resilience. We discuss the hypothesis that culture influences trust and a society’s 
propensity to cooperate, which are important inputs for resilience. 
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 Abbreviations 
CC Climate change 
CRI Climate Risk Index 
EVS European Values Study 
GCCA+ Global Climate Change Alliance 
HDI Human Development Index 
INFORM Index of Risk Management 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
ND-GAIN Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index 
WRI World Risk Index 
WVS World Values Survey 
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 1 Introduction  
The problems associated with mitigating climate change (CC), coupled with the fact that 
some consequences of a changing climate are already inevitable, make it ever more 
urgent to answer the question of how to foster adaptation and resilience (IPCC, 2014). It 
is generally understood that the susceptibility of an entity to be negatively affected 
depends on its vulnerability and exposure. The resilience of a system, i.e. its ability to 
maintain its basic function, depends on, among other things, the system’s vulnerability 
and its adaptive capacity (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2001). Vulnerability and the capacity of 
a society to adapt depend on its social aspects, as well as its fundamental biological, 
chemical and physical properties. The level of socio-economic development can be seen 
as a major determinant of vulnerability. While the debate as to what determines 
development is still open, there is some agreement that, next to resource endowments, 
historical contingencies and path dependency, institutions, social norms and culture are 
important drivers of development (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2015).  
This paper focuses on the importance of cultural aspects in the context of risk from and 
resilience to CC. First, we briefly review some evidence for the importance of culture in 
economics and for the role of culture as a facilitator or a hindrance in the adaptation to 
climate change (Section 2). We will then ask how culture can be conceptualised and 
measured and will discuss three aspects of culture that can be subject to a quantitative 
analysis (Section 3). In Section 4, available measures of CC risk and resilience are 
discussed. The analysis of how these measures of resilience and risk are related to the 
measures of culture is presented in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 will further investigate 
the quantitative analysis for the Index of Risk Management (INFORM). Section 8 
discusses checks of robustness and restricts the analysis to the EU-28 sample. Potential 
explanations for the observed phenomena are discussed in Section 9 and conclusions are 
drawn in Section 10. 
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 2 Culture in the economic literature 
2.1 The relevance of culture for economic outcomes 
While Adam Smith was already concerned with culture (Fleischacker, 2013), the modern 
economic profession had for a long time, by and large, ignored the effects of culture on 
economic outcomes (Guiso et al., 2006). This changed when experiments in the 
laboratory and in the field in different societies convincingly demonstrated cultural 
differences in economically relevant behaviour across societies (Roth et al., 1991; 
Croson and Buchan, 1999; Henrich et al., 2001, 2004; Brandts et al., 2004;, Gurven et 
al., 2008).  
The literature on social capital, as initiated by Putnam et al. (1994), Putnam (1995) and 
Knack and Keefer (1997), raised the awareness of the importance of idiosyncratic social 
aspects of a given society for its economic performance. Social capital is often 
approximated with measures of civic attitudes, participation in social groups and trust. 
Social capital and trust, in particular, are shown to have a positive effect on economic 
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Bjørnskov, 2012; Serritzlew et al., 2014). Trust is also 
considered a central cultural ingredient, at both a social and communal level, to 
overcome collective action problems associated with public goods and the tragedy of the 
commons (Pretty, 2003; Brondizio et al., 2009; Ostrom, 2010).1  
The influence of culture on development is now widely accepted (Lopez-Claros and 
Perotti, 2014). The literature discusses both aspects, culture facilitating and inhibiting 
development (e.g. Arrow, 1971). A nice overview of the debate and the importance of 
culture for a plethora of outcomes, such as female labour force participation, fertility, 
political engagement, redistribution, migration and others, is provided by Fernández 
(2011). A more recent survey of the economic effects of culture is provided by Marini 
(2016). 
Guiso et al. (2006) saw the circular causality between economics and culture as one 
reason why economics for a long time did not consider cultural factors to explain 
differences in economic outcomes (see also Bowles, 1998).2 The observation that certain 
cultural aspects are exogenous from an individual point of view motivated the generation 
of large, and constantly increasing, body of literature analysing cultural effects on 
economic outcomes. 
2.2 The relevance of culture for vulnerability and adaptation 
The importance of culture in many contexts is also discussed in the CC literature. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in its latest assessment report, 
acknowledged that risk perception and security needs, which constitute an important 
determinant of the demand for adaptive measures, are at least partly culture specific 
1 We will elaborate on this relation of trust and public good provision in the discussion of our 
empirical findings in Section 9. 
2 These two opposite directions of causation are nicely captured in the hypotheses of Marx and 
Weber: for Marx, the material conditions determined the social structure and a society’s value 
system while, for Weber, some very specific values created the economic structure of capitalism. 
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 (IPCC, 2014). This is closely related to the values-based approach to vulnerability and 
adaptation, which states that a proper definition of adaptation objectives and 
understanding of vulnerability necessitates an analysis of the values affected (O’Brien 
and Wolf, 2010; Adger et al., 2013). A broad framing of values that extend beyond 
market prices will open the perspective on symbolic, ethical and religious values in 
societies that might effectively constitute culture specific limits to adaptation (Adger et 
al., 2009). Finally, differences in the ability to overcome collective action problems 
across societies (Henrich et al., 2001; Hermann et al., 2008) are rooted in cultural 
differences. To the extent that adaptation and adaptive capacity depend on collective 
action, these cultural differences will have a direct effect on a country’s resilience and 
adaptive capacity.3 
The empirical analysis undertaken in this paper focuses on macro-level aspects of 
culture, i.e. cultural aggregates at the level of the nation state. This level was chosen 
because the resilience and risk measures (introduced in Section 4) are available only at 
the country level. In addition, structural aspects can be captured only at the macro level. 
It could, however, be argued that, for a thorough understanding of how culture affects 
human behaviour and how this feeds into resilience, a micro-level analysis would be 
warranted. Many economic analyses of culture, particularly in the fields of trust, social 
capital and social norms, look at beliefs and values held by individuals, which are 
measured by individual responses to survey questions. Albeit a widespread exercise, the 
measurement of cultural aspects with the help of individual survey responses has 
undergone serious critique; some scholars argue that culture results from the creation of 
intersubjective meaning, which emanates from relations between individuals and 
contexts in which these relations happen, and are thus supra-individual (Gauri et al., 
2013; Woolcock, 2014). Schwartz (2014) also argues that culture, which he understands 
as a latent value system justifying and enabling the functioning of social institutions, is 
external to the individual. 
3 Measures of culture 
3.1 Measurement and concepts of culture 
What is culture and how can it be measured? There are multiple different definitions of 
culture. The Merriam Webster Dictionary alone provides four different definitions:  
(1) ‘the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behaviour that 
depends upon the capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding 
generations’;  
(2) ‘the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, 
or social group; also: the characteristic features of everyday existence (as 
diversions or a way of life) shared by people in a place or time’;  
(3) ‘the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an 
institution or organization’; 
3 We will elaborate on this hypothesis in Section 9. 
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 (4) ‘the set of values, conventions, or social practices associated with a particular 
field, activity, or societal characteristic’. 
Guiso et al. (2006) define culture as ‘those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, 
religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation’. 
Fernández (2011) rejects this notion of culture as it excludes the possibility of cultural 
learning and change, which are arguably central aspects in human development. Since 
quantitative analysis exploits variation to identify causation (or at least correlation), 
Fernández provides a working definition for ‘differences in culture as systematic 
variations in beliefs and preferences across time, space or social groups’ (Fernández, 
2011). 4  Given the opaque nature of the relation between individual beliefs and 
preferences on the one hand, and the social structure of society on the other, we also 
pay attention to variables capturing the social structure.  
In the present paper we look at three aspects of culture: the individualism/collectivism 
distinction as provided by Hofstede (2001); the extent of religiosity in a country as 
expressed in the frequency of religious practices; and the level of ethnical, religious and 
linguistic fractionalisation in a country. While religiosity fits in the working definition of 
Fernández (2011), fractionalisation is a structural parameter measuring the difference of 
countries with respect to differences in beliefs and preferences within each country. 
Individualism/collectivism is an aggregate concept, derived from the aggregation of 
individual preferences and beliefs. We will now describe our measure in some detail. 
3.2 Individualism and collectivism 
Hofstede (2001) applied cluster analysis on surveys sampled in 50 countries to identify 
five cultural dimensions: (1) power distance, (2) uncertainty avoidance, (3) 
masculinity/femininity, (4) long-term/short-term orientation and (5) 
individualism/collectivism.5 Hofstede’s five dimensions are generally considered reliable 
and valid measures of culture (Schimmack et al., 2005; Yoo et al., 2011). Some 
dimensions can even be replicated from existing survey data collected for different 
purposes (Minkov and Hofstede, 2014a). The dimension of individualism/collectivism in 
particular has attracted a great deal of attention. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011a, b) 
found that it is the most important cultural measure influencing long-term economic 
growth. They also provided an integrated review of individualism in economics and social 
psychology (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2012). Some contributions from social 
psychology have pointed out the statistical relation between collectivism and pronoun 
drop, i.e. the characteristic of some languages to not use pronouns. There is a 
theoretical argument in linguistics and social psychology that states that language is the 
symbolic environment in which humans operate. As such, it shapes and is shaped by the 
interactive patterns and the specific form of social organisation prevailing in a language 
area. The statistical relation between Hofstede’s measure of individualism and non-
pronoun drop are seen as evidence for this theory (Kashima and Kashima, 1998, 2003, 
4 This definition follows methodological individualism and roots culture in the individual.  
5 It is the hypothesis of the authors that uncertainty avoidance should, in principle, be associated 
with the distribution of individual risk aversion in a country and short-term/long-term orientation 
with the distribution of individual discount rates. This question needs to be addressed in future 
research.  
9 
 
                                          
 2005). The linguistic data are particularly interesting as the evolution of language is 
comparatively slow and thus exogenous to most economic outcomes. In addition, books 
provide access to the historic use of language in the last decades. Accordingly, these 
data have been used in the economic literature to assess culture (Licht et al., 2007; 
Tabellini, 2008). The summary statistics of the individualism and non-drop measures are 
shown in Table 3.1.  
3.3 Religiosity 
The second cultural category we looked at is the degree of religiosity, as expressed by 
religious practice in a country. While it could be argued that belief systems vary widely 
across different religions, there is some evidence that attitudes differ more between 
cultures than they do between people from different religions (Minkov and Hofstede, 
2014b). Accordingly, we focused our attention on the degree of religiosity rather than 
looking at different religious practices. To measure religiosity we looked at a number of 
responses from the World Values Survey (WVS, 2015) and the European Values Study 
(EVS, 2015) [frequency of attendance at religious services (religious_reg, 
religious_some, religious_never), 6  the frequency of individual prayer (pray_reg, 
pray_some, pray_never), the belief in God (believe_god) and the importance of God in 
one’s life (god_important)] and aggregated them at the country level. We focused on the 
respondents with regular attendance at religious service and higher frequency of prayer, 
and dropped the complementary variables. We were thus left with the proportion of 
respondents who regularly attend religious services (religious_reg), the proportion of 
respondents who regularly pray (pray_reg), the proportion of people who believe in God 
(believe god) and the mean value for the country of how important people feel that God 
is in their lives (important_god). The summary statistics and descriptions of the 
variables are presented in Table 3.1. The survey items and details on the construction of 
the variables are described in Table A1 in the appendix. 
3.4 Ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalisation 
Higher levels of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity might impose a burden on 
communication and cooperation within a given society, which might result in negative 
effects on a society’s coping capacity and its resilience. Arguments on the influence of 
ethnic heterogeneity on economic growth and cooperation have been put forward by a 
number of authors Easterly and Levine (1997), Arcand et al. (2000), Alesina et al. 
(2003), Fearon  (2003) and, Desmet et al. (2016).  
To determine if cultural heterogeneity is an important factor for resilience to CC, we 
considered a number of available measures of fractionalisation. Fractionalisation in 
general measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given 
country will not belong to the same group, when the group can be defined by either 
ethnicity, language or religion. Two secondary data sources were employed in this 
analysis. Alesina et al. (2003) provide data on ethnic fractionalisation (al_ethnic), 
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (al_language) and religious fractionalisation (al_religion). 
Fearon (2003) provide an alternative measure of ethnic fractionalisation (fe_etfra) and 
an elaborated measure of cultural diversity (fe_cultdiv), as well as a measure of 
6 Variables names are always set in italics. 
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 ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (elf) and the number of groups in a country (numgrps). 
Summary statistics are provided in Table 3.1, variable descriptions and data sources are 
detailed in Table A2 in the appendix. Alternative measures of fractionalisation and 
heterogeneity are being employed to assure the robustness of any findings. 
Table 3.1 Description and descriptive statistics of cultural variables 
Variable No of observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum Description 
individualism 67 43.716 24.052 6 91 Hofstede’s measure of 
individualism 
nondrop 73 0.301 0.462 0 1 Linguistic category of 
pronoun drop  
religion_reg 101 0.443 0.252 0.094 0.912 Percentage of respondents 
regularly participating in 
religious service  
pray_reg 68 0.503 0.248 0.008 0.940 Percentage  of respondents 
regularly praying 
belief_god 92 0.847 0.185 0.188 1.000 Percentage  of respondents 
believing in God 
Important_god 103 7.590 1.891 2.900 9.874 Mean importance of God (1–
10) 
al_ethnic 97 0.392 0.239 0.002 0.930 Ethnic fractionalisation 
al_language 94 0.359 0.272 0.002 0.923 Language fractionalisation 
al_religion 96 0.426 0.229 0.003 0.860 Religious fractionalisation 
fe_cultdiv 158 0.309 0.208 0.000 0.733 Cultural diversity 
fe_etfra 159 0.475 0.260 0.002 1.000 Ethnic fractionalisation 
elf 129 0.428 0.288 0.004 0.925 Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation 
numgrps 160 5.138 3.506 0 22 Number of ethnic groups 
SD, standard deviation. 
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 4 Measuring climate change risk and resilience 
It is generally understood that the susceptibility of an entity to be negatively affected 
depends on its vulnerability and exposure. The resilience of a system, i.e. its ability to 
maintain its basic functioning, depends on the system’s vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity.7 The very general definition of resilience as a system’s ability to maintain its 
basic functioning goes back to Holling (1973). It has been modified with differing, more 
specific and context-dependent definitions. For example, Hallegatte (2014) defined 
macroeconomic resilience as the ability of an economy to minimise aggregate 
consumption losses for a given capital loss resulting from an external shock. 
Microeconomic resilience in this context is the ability of a household to minimise welfare 
losses for a given consumption loss. 
Both resilience and the related concept of vulnerability are multifaceted, 
multidimensional and complex concepts, which are inherently difficult to measure. One 
approach to empirically conceptualise them is via composite indicators. Different authors 
follow a number of approaches in constructing such indices of resilience or vulnerability. 
Overview and discussion on this topic is provided by Füssel (2010), Miola and Simonet 
(2014) and Miola et al. (2015). 
In our analysis we looked at a number of different composite indicators which are 
constructed with the aim of capturing vulnerability or risks from CC. The implicit 
assumption is that resilience and vulnerability or risk are strongly inversely related 
concepts, i.e. less vulnerability implies more resilience and vice versa. We are interested 
in knowing if vulnerability, risk or resilience, as measured by these indicators, are 
statistically related with aspects of culture, and, where such a relation exists, whether or 
not it is meaningful and can provide additional insights into the dynamics of adaptation 
and vulnerability. 
In the first step, we used six different indices to assure that observed correlations are 
not driven by the idiosyncratic construction of any one index. The six indices employed 
were INFORM (De Groeve et al., 2015), the World Risk Index (WRI) 2015 (Birkmann et 
al., 2011; Welle and Birkmann, 2015), the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-
GAIN) 2014 (Chen et al., 2015), the DARA Risk Reduction Index 2010 (DARA, 2013), the 
Climate Risk Index (CRI) 2014 (Anemüller et al., 2006; Kreft et al., 2016) and the 
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA+) index (Miola et al., 2015). The GCCA+ index is 
restricted to the least developed countries; all other indices provide maximal coverage 
given data availability. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the data available from the 
original indices. To simplify exposition and interpretation, all indices were recoded so 
that higher index scores indicate a higher level of risk, thereby implying lower levels of 
resilience. Accordingly, in the present work, higher values of ND-GAIN indicate lower 
readiness, more vulnerability, or both.  
7 Resilience, vulnerability and adaptation are concepts that apply at all scales. An individual, a 
community, a city, a country and any other socio-ecological system, in general, can be resilient, 
vulnerable or adapted. This is one of the reasons why these concepts are rather blurry. In the 
remainder of this paper the relevant socio-ecological system under consideration is the nation 
state, unless otherwise stated. 
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 Table 4.1 Overview of vulnerability and resilience measures 
Name Variable Definition Direction of 
original indicator 
INFORM informrisk The INFORM model is based on risk concepts 
published in scientific literature and envisages 
three dimensions of risk: hazards and exposure; 
vulnerability; and lack of coping capacity. The 
INFORM model is split into different levels to 
provide a quick overview of the underlying 
factors leading to humanitarian risk and builds up 
the picture of risk by 53 core indicators. All 
natural disaster hazards are included. 
(–) higher values 
imply more risk 
WRI, 2015 wri2015 WRI refers to the understanding of risk within the 
natural hazards and disaster risk community, 
where disaster risk is defined as the product of 
the interaction of physical hazards and the 
vulnerabilities of exposed elements. 
WRI = Exposure * [(1/3) * (Susceptibility + Lack 
of Coping Capacity + Lack of Adaptive Capacity] 
(–) higher values 
imply more risk 
ND-GAIN, 2014 gain2014 ND-GAIN shows countries’ vulnerabilities caused 
by climate disruption, as well as their readiness 
to successfully implement adaptation solutions.  
ND-GAIN Score = (Readiness score –
 Vulnerability score + 1) * 50  
(+) higher values 
imply better 
readiness or lower 
vulnerability 
DARA, 2010 dara2010 The vulnerability assessment system indicates 
the level of climate-related vulnerability. Five 
vulnerability levels are statistically determined 
via (mean absolute) standard deviation. 
(–) higher values 
imply more 
vulnerability 
CRI criscore  The CRI indicates the level of exposure and 
vulnerability to extreme events, it does not 
provide an all-encompassing analysis of the risks 
of anthropogenic climate change, but should be 
seen as just one analysis explaining countries' 
exposure and vulnerability to climate-related 
risks as only weather-related events — storms, 
floods, temperature extremes and mass 
movements (hot and cold waves etc.) — are 
incorporated. 
(–) higher values 
imply more 
exposure and 
vulnerability 
GCCA+ gccascore The GCCA+ index captures vulnerability to 
climate change. It consists of four components: 
hazard, exposure, vulnerability and 
coping/adaptive capacity. Only climate-related 
hazards are included. 
GCCA+ 
score = [(Hazard * Exposure) + Vulnerability + (
1 – Capacity)]/3 
(–) higher values 
imply more 
exposure, higher 
vulnerability or 
lower capacity 
Summary statistics of the indices are shown in Table 4.2. To some degree the different 
risk indices capture the same information. This can be seen in Table 4.3, where the 
correlation coefficients between the indices are depicted. While the overlap is far from 
perfect, there is considerable correlation between the different indices. It is worth noting 
that the CRI has negative correlations or no association at all with the other indices. 
INFORM, WRI, GCCA+ and GAIN were all comparatively strongly correlated with each 
other. 
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 Table 4.2 Summary statistics of risk indices 
Variable 
No of 
observations 
Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
informrisk 191 3.583 1.751 0.2 8.8 
wri_2015 170 7.442 5.098 0.1 36.43 
gain2014 180 47.574 13.434 18.13 75.13 
dara2010 184 2.554 1.398 1 5 
criscore 180 89.282 40.484 10.33 169.67 
gccascore 111 0.465 0.076 0.24 0.62 
SD, standard deviation. 
Table 4.3 Correlation coefficients of risk indices — scores 
 
informrisk wri_2015 gain2014 dara2010 criscore gccascore 
informrisk 1 
     
wri_2015 0.3861* 1 
    
gain2014 0.7442* 0.4403* 1 
   
dara2010 0.4590* 0.4846* 0.7359* 1 
  
criscore –0.1987* –0.1687* 0.0767 –0.0306 1 
 
gccascore 0.5662* 0.2114* 0.6113* 0.4690* –0.1378 1 
Note: Pearson correlation based on 93–184 observations; *p < 0.05. 
 
4.1 Country rankings 
As all indices used different metrics, country rankings resulting from the indices were 
calculated. Lower rankings indicate less vulnerability. Country rankings and index scores 
are, thus, positively correlated. The correlation coefficients between country rankings are 
shown in Table 4.4. It is obvious that correlation coefficients are slightly higher for 
almost all combinations of variables. 
Table 4.4 Correlation coefficients of risk indices — ranks 
 
rank_inform rank_wri rank_gain rank_dara rank_cri rank_gcca 
rank_inform 1 
     
rank_wri 0.5727* 1 
    
rank_gain 0.7590* 0.6204* 1 
   
rank_dara 0.4672* 0.6030* 0.7550* 1 
  
rank_cri –0.1811* –0.1647* 0.0776 –0.0397 1 
 
rank_gcca 0.5564* 0.3655* 0.6874* 0.4964* –0.026 1 
Note: Pearson correlation based on 93–184 observations; *p < 0.05. 
 
By using the Spearman rank correlation instead of the Pearson correlation to calculate 
correlation coefficients, the size of the coefficients and their significance are qualitatively 
similar for both score and rank.  
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 5 Correlation between measures of culture and resilience 
In this section we provide simple, unconditional correlation coefficients between cultural 
variables and composite indicators of climate risk. As will be seen, there is considerable 
correlation between most of these variables, providing evidence for the importance of 
cultural aspects of resilience. Our hypothesis, to be developed further below, relates 
cultural factors to a society’s ability to cooperate and overcome collective action 
problems, thereby reducing vulnerability and fostering resilience to CC. The 
interpretation of the correlation coefficients and the relations indicated by these will be 
examined in the next sections. 
 
5.1 Individualism and collectivism 
The simple correlations, as presented in Table 5.1, suggested that more individualistic 
societies face lower CC risk and vulnerability, and are thus more resilient. The CRI score 
and the GCCA+ score show no correlation. The GCCA+ sample was probably too small. 
The CRI score is based on losses from extreme weather events, so cultural aspects 
should not matter greatly.8 
Table 5.1 Simple correlations for individualism 
 informrisk wri_2015 gain2014 dara2010 criscore gccascore 
individualism –0.52*** –0.47*** –0.68*** –0.45*** 0.14 –0.02 
 65 64 65 63 66 11 
nondrop –0.45*** –0.29* –0.56*** –0.25* 0.04 0.26 
 71 69 71 69 72 15 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
 
5.2 Religiousness 
For our measures of religiosity, most correlation coefficients, shown in Table 5.2, 
indicate that more religiosity and a more intensive practice of religion are associated 
with greater CC risks and lower resilience. Again, the CRI and GCCA+ scores have very 
low correlations with most measures of religiosity. The results showed that religiousness 
might be related to socio-economic development. However, this phenomenon needs to 
be studied further. 
 
 
8 The coefficients reported in Section 5 are based on Pearson’s correlation. Results are, in general, 
tested for robustness using the Spearman rank correlation. These statistics are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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 Table 5.2 Simple correlations for religiousness 
 informrisk wri_2015 gain2014 dara2010 criscore gccascore 
religion_reg 0.50*** 0.39*** 0.61*** 0.57*** –0.08 0.61*** 
 99 95 99 96 98 30 
pray_reg 0.60*** 0.33** 0.66*** 0.50*** 0.04 0.28 
 68 65 68 66 66 15 
belief_god 0.40*** 0.16 0.49*** 0.28** 0.20+ –0.06 
 91 87 91 89 90 24 
important_god 0.60*** 0.33*** 0.74*** 0.44*** 0.15 0.15 
 101 97 101 98 100 30 
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
5.3 Ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalisation 
The correlations with measures of cultural heterogeneity are all positive, albeit not 
always significant, and sometimes rather small. Overall, however, a picture emerges that 
more heterogeneous and fractionalised societies face higher CC risks and exhibit less 
resilience. Table 5.3 shows the correlation coefficients for the heterogeneity measures 
used by Fearon (2003). Ethnic fractionalisation (fe_etfra) and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation (elf) in particular show consistently positive and, for the most part, 
considerable correlations. The data in Table 5.4 were calculated using the measures 
employed by Alesina et al. (2003). Coefficients are comparable to those from Fearon. 
The underlying argument, thoroughly developed in Section 9, is that more heterogeneity 
prevents cooperation in society and this increases vulnerability and reduces resilience. 
Note that religious fractionalisation (al_religion) is not statistically significantly related to 
any of the risk measures. 
Table 5.3 Simple correlations for Fearon-measures of fractionalisation  
 informrisk wri_2015 gain2014 dara2010 criscore gccascore 
fe_cultdiv 0.30*** 0.04 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.20* 0.17 
 153 147 151 152 151 80 
fe_etfra 0.43*** 0.10 0.53*** 0.49*** 0.24** 0.40*** 
 154 148 152 153 152 81 
Elf 0.42*** 0.23* 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.17+ 0.24+ 
 125 122 124 124 123 69 
numgrps 0.35*** 0.05 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.12 0.36** 
 153 147 151 152 151 81 
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
Table 5.4 Simple correlations for Alesina-measures of fractionalisation 
 informrisk wri_2015 gain2014 dara2010 criscore gccascore 
al_ethnic 0.47*** 0.05 0.53*** 0.44*** 0.09 0.15 
 93 91 93 92 94 29 
al_language 0.43*** 0.21+ 0.46*** 0.52*** 0.03 0.47* 
 91 89 91 90 92 27 
al_religion 0.01 0.03 –0.06 0.09 0.01 0.11 
 93 91 93 92 94 29 
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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 6 Simple correlations of culture and the INFORM index 
Composite indicators unite different concepts so that a more disaggregated look at how 
cultural variables relate to the concepts embodied within the composite indicators might 
provide additional understanding. We focus here on the INFORM index since it is 
available for the biggest country sample. 
The INFORM index embodies ‘hazard exposure’, ‘vulnerability’ and ‘lack of coping 
capacity’, which are further subdivided into natural and human hazards, socio-economic 
vulnerability and vulnerable groups, and institutional and infrastructure as determinants 
of coping capacity (De Groeve et al., 2015). We consider the original index score to be 
level 1, the underlying concepts (hazard exposure, vulnerability, lack of coping capacity) 
to be level 2 and their sub-concepts, accordingly, to be level 3. For each group of 
cultural variables, a first table presents the correlations with level 1 and 2 concepts, and 
a second table the correlations with level 3 categories. The sub-indices and their 
different elements are depicted in Table A3 in the appendix. 
The correlations indicate that culture and risk/resilience are mainly linked through 
vulnerability and the lack of coping capacity. This is not surprising. More interesting are 
the coefficients obtained at level 3. For almost all cultural variables, the correlation with 
infrastructure is more important than with institutional factors of coping capacity. Socio-
economic vulnerability is always more important than vulnerable groups. 
6.1 Individualism and collectivism 
The correlation of informrisk and individualism (and nondrop) are mainly driven by the 
lack of coping capacity (see Table 6.1). At level 3 (Table 6.2) it becomes obvious that, 
not only are institution and infrastructure important determinants of coping capacity, but 
socio-economic vulnerability also has comparable large, negative correlation coefficients. 
It is, however, surprising that the exposure to natural hazards is also strongly negatively 
correlated with individualism.  
Table 6.1 Individualism and INFORM level 1 and 2  
 Informrisk Hazard exposure Vulnerability Lack of coping capacity 
individualism –0.52*** –0.43*** –0.41*** –0.64*** 
 65 65 65 65 
Nondrop –0.45*** –0.43*** –0.27* –0.50*** 
 71 71 71 71 
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
Table 6.2 Individualism and INFORM level 3 
 Natural Human 
Socio-
economic 
vulnerability 
Vulnerable 
groups 
Institutional Infrastructure 
individualism –0.42*** –0.36** –0.62*** –0.19 –0.59*** –0.60*** 
 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Nondrop –0.41*** –0.38** –0.43*** –0.11 –0.57*** –0.38** 
 71 71 71 71 71 71 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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 6.2 Religiosity 
At level 2 (Table 6.3) the proportion of people regularly attending religious services 
(religion_reg) is most strongly correlated with vulnerability. All other variables are most 
strongly linked with lack of coping capacity. At level 3 (Table 6.4,) socio-economic 
vulnerability and infrastructure have the highest correlation coefficients. 
Table 6.3 Religiosity and INFORM levels 1 and 2 
 Informrisk Hazard exposure Vulnerability Lack of coping capacity 
religion_reg 0.50*** 0.32** 0.56*** 0.53*** 
 99 99 99 99 
pray_reg 0.60*** 0.46*** 0.61*** 0.62*** 
 68 68 68 68 
belief_god 0.40*** 0.25* 0.41*** 0.47*** 
 91 91 91 91 
important_god 0.60*** 0.43*** 0.55*** 0.66*** 
 101 101 101 101 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
Table 6.4 Religiosity and INFORM level 3 
 Natural Human 
Socio-
economic 
vulnerability 
Vulnerable 
groups 
Institutional Infrastructure 
religion_reg 0.18+ 0.37*** 0.66*** 0.40*** 0.32** 0.63*** 
 99 99 99 99 99 99 
pray_reg 0.29* 0.50*** 0.66*** 0.45*** 0.52*** 0.64*** 
 68 68 68 68 68 68 
belief_god 0.12 0.31** 0.48*** 0.28** 0.42*** 0.44*** 
 91 91 91 91 91 91 
important_god 0.24* 0.48*** 0.64*** 0.38*** 0.60*** 0.62*** 
 101 101 101 101 101 101 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
6.3 Ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalisation 
Table 6.5 Fractionalisation and INFORM level 1 and 2 
 Informrisk Hazard exposure Vulnerability Lack of coping capacity 
fe_cultdiv 0.30*** 0.14+ 0.32*** 0.36*** 
 153 153 153 153 
fe_etfra 0.43*** 0.14+ 0.52*** 0.52*** 
 154 154 154 154 
Elf 0.42*** 0.14 0.48*** 0.51*** 
 125 125 125 125 
numgrps 0.35*** 0.14+ 0.41*** 0.39*** 
 153 153 153 153 
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
The variables of cultural heterogeneity are much more related to vulnerability and coping 
capacity than to hazard exposure (see Table 6.5). At level 3 (Table 6.7) it is seen that 
the measures of fractionalisation are most strongly related to socio-economic 
vulnerability and infrastructure. This also holds true for the fractionalisation measures 
from Alesina et al. (2003). Again, religious fractionalisation is unrelated to these risk and 
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 resilience measures. 
Table 6.6 Fractionalisation and INFORM level 3 
 Natural Human 
Socio-
economic 
vulnerability 
Vulnerable 
groups 
Institutional Infrastructure 
fe_cultdiv –0.04 0.23** 0.35*** 0.23** 0.23** 0.40*** 
 153 153 153 153 153 153 
fe_etfra –0.06 0.26** 0.56*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.58*** 
 154 154 154 154 154 154 
elf –0.03 0.24** 0.50*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.57*** 
 125 125 125 125 125 125 
numgrps –0.03 0.24** 0.42*** 0.33*** 0.23** 0.46*** 
 153 153 153 153 153 153 
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
Table 6.7 Fractionalisation and INFORM levels 1 and 2 
 Informrisk Hazard exposure Vulnerability Lack of coping capacity 
al_ethnic 0.47*** 0.27** 0.48*** 0.54*** 
 93 93 93 93 
al_language 0.43*** 0.22* 0.49*** 0.47*** 
 91 91 91 91 
al_religion 0.01 –0.06 0.04 0.06 
 93 93 93 93 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
Table 6.8 Fractionalisation and INFORM level 3 
 Natural Human 
Socio-
economic 
vulnerability 
Vulnerable 
groups 
Institutional Infrastructure 
al_ethnic 0.09 0.37*** 0.56*** 0.33** 0.39*** 0.56*** 
 93 93 93 93 93 93 
al_language 0.04 0.33** 0.54*** 0.38*** 0.27** 0.55*** 
 91 91 91 91 91 91 
al_religion –0.05 –0.10 0.06 0.03 –0.01 0.08 
 93 93 93 93 93 93 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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 7 Conditional correlations  
All cultural measures analysed are strongly correlated with socio-economic development 
(see Table 7.1; summary statistics for the socio-economic variables are presented in 
Table 7.2), which is, of course, a main determinant of vulnerability and the capacity to 
cope with adverse events. The observed correlations might thus be driven by the 
covariation between the cultural variables, economic development and the elements of 
the composite indicators. To assure that cultural variables are related to risk/resilience 
conditional on economic development, multivariate regression analysis was employed. 
Multivariate regressions also allowed us to analyse if individualism, religiosity and 
cultural heterogeneity are jointly related to risk/resilience.  
In general, multivariate regression analysis is used to explain a dependent variable with 
a set of explanatory, independent variables. As the composite index contains measures 
of socio-economic development, endogeneity of the estimates is an issue. To attenuate 
the problem of endogeneity we constructed an indicator variable from the composite 
index, grouping the countries into quintiles and alternatively, for robustness checks, into 
deciles. We again focused on INFORM. The newly constructed indicator variables, as well 
as the measures of socio-economic development, are summarised in Table 7.2. We are 
aware that our analysis is not suited to identification of a causal relation. Additionally, 
estimates may still be biased owing to endogeneity bias. 
Table 7.1 Correlation coefficients of risk indices/cultural variables with per capita GDP 
(purchasing power parity)/Human Development Index 
 gdp_pc_ppp undp_hdi 
Informrisk –0.61*** –0.75*** 
 180 184 
wri_2015 –0.41*** –0.40*** 
 165 170 
gain2014 –0.69*** –0.91*** 
 174 180 
dara2010 –0.60*** –0.74*** 
 175 179 
Criscore 0.22** –0.03 
 174 178 
Gccascore –0.59*** –0.67*** 
 101 102 
religion_reg –0.38*** –0.63*** 
 97 100 
pray_reg –0.42*** –0.61*** 
 66 68 
belief_god –0.30** –0.38*** 
 89 91 
important_god –0.36*** –0.61*** 
 99 102 
 gdp_pc_ppp undp_hdi 
individualism 0.54*** 0.65*** 
 64 65 
nondrop 0.40*** 0.44*** 
 70 71 
   
al_ethnic –0.24* –0.50*** 
 91 94 
al_language –0.24* –0.52*** 
 89 92 
al_religion –0.12 –0.05 
 91 94 
fe_cultdiv –0.17* –0.38*** 
 146 151 
fe_etfra –0.35*** –0.54*** 
 147 152 
elf –0.44*** –0.57*** 
 119 124 
numgrps –0.30*** –0.44*** 
 146 151 
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 Table 7.2 Summary statistics (inform_quint, inform_dec, pc_gdp_ppp and undp_hdi) 
Variable 
No of 
observations 
Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
inform_quint 191 2.979 1.429 1 5 
inform_dec 191 5.419 2.915 1 10 
gdp_pc_ppp 187 18 381.33 21 539.45 697.87 140 707.8 
undp_hdi 185 0.651 0.160 0.288 0.909 
SD, standard deviation. 
 
7.1 Individualism and religiosity 
Employing ordered logit regressions, the results of the unconditional correlations from 
sub-sections 5.1 and 5.2 are reproduced with the new indicator variable (inform_quint). 
As shown in Table 7.3, the variables individualism and nondrop reduce the likelihood 
that a country is in a high-risk group and the proxies of religiosity increase the 
likelihood. If socio-economic development, e.g. in the form of per capita GDP in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) (gdp_pc_ppp) is included (Table 7.4), the result for 
individualism disappears and the coefficient for the linguistic correlate of individualism 
(nondrop) is smaller and has a much higher p-value. This indicates that the relation 
between resilience or vulnerability and individualism are indeed mostly because more 
individualistic countries have on average, a higher level of socio-economic development, 
although this does not imply causation. 
Table 7.3 Ordered logit estimates for individualism and religiousness 
inform_quint (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
individualism –0.042***      
 (–3.80)      
nondrop  –2.047***     
  (–3.86)     
religion_reg   4.631***    
   (5.31)    
pray_reg    6.020***   
    (5.08)   
belief_god     5.691***  
     (3.84)  
important_god      0.813*** 
      (6.10) 
N 65 71 99 68 91 101 
The t statistic is presented in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
The coefficients for religiosity (Table 7.4) are all positive and highly significant, and 
remain so after controlling for socio-economic development. Accordingly, the relation of 
religiosity to resilience is, at best, partly mediated through the relation of religiosity with 
socio-economic development. 
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 Table 7.4 Ordered logit estimates for individualism and religiousness with pc GDP 
inform_quint (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
gdp_pc_ppp –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** 
 (–4.23) (–4.64) (–5.78) (–4.16) (–5.58) (–5.21) 
individualism 0.003      
 (0.19)      
nondrop  –1.054+     
  (–1.72)     
religion_reg   3.066***    
   (3.35)    
pray_reg    4.229***   
    (3.37)   
belief_god     3.046*  
     (2.42)  
important_god      0.580*** 
      (3.99) 
N 63 69 97 66 89 99 
The t statistic is presented in parentheses; +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
7.2 Ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalisation 
The unconditional correlation results from section 5.3 have been confirmed (see Table 
7.5).9 A higher level of ethnic or ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (al_ethnic, al_language, 
fe_etrfa, elf), more cultural diversity (fe_cultdiv) and a higher number of ethnic groups 
(numgrps) all increase the probability of a country being in a high-risk country group. If 
socio-economic development is added to the estimations (see Table 7.6), coefficients 
become smaller and p-values increase, but the results are qualitatively unchanged. 
Cultural heterogeneity seems to have a relation with CC risk beyond its relation with 
socio-economic development.10  
Table 7.5 Ordered logit estimates for fractionalisation 
inform_quint (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
al_ethnic 4.165***      
 (4.72)      
al_language  3.247***     
  (4.33)     
fe_cultdiv   2.673***    
   (3.72)    
fe_etfra    3.412***   
    (5.60)   
Elf     3.296***  
     (5.32)  
numgrps      0.216*** 
      (4.36) 
N 93 91 153 154 125 153 
The t statistic is presented in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
9 For reasons of exposition, religious fractionalisation (al_religion) is not included in this and the 
following tables. Religious fractionalisation was not related to any of our resilience measures and is 
also not significant in any estimates presented in the current section. 
10  Some authors claim that there is a causal relation between cultural heterogeneity and 
socioeconomic development (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003). 
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 Table 7.6 Ordered logit estimates for fractionalisation with per capita GDP 
inform_quint (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
gdp_pc_ppp –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** 
 (–5.31) (–6.40) (–7.66) (–7.14) (–6.58) (–7.38) 
al_ethnic 2.179*      
 (2.12)      
al_language  1.740*     
  (2.05)     
fe_cultdiv   2.045**    
   (2.59)    
fe_etfra    2.117**   
    (3.11)   
elf     1.768*  
     (2.56)  
numgrps      0.107* 
      (2.12) 
N 91 89 146 147 119 146 
The t statistic is presented in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
 
7.3 All categories of cultural variables 
Finally, all three aspects of culture, individualism, religiosity and cultural heterogeneity, 
were looked at together. Table 7.7 presents the results for when the variables for 
cultural heterogeneity were added to socio-economic development (gdp_pc_ppp) and 
religiosity (i.e. percentage of population that regularly attends religious services, 
religion_reg). Socio-economic development and religiosity produced the expected results 
and were highly significant. For cultural heterogeneity the coefficients were positive, but 
only in half of cases were they significant.  
Table 7.7 Ordered logit estimates 
inform_quint (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
gdp_pc_ppp –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** 
 (-4.76) (-5.31) (-5.42) (-5.28) (-4.98) (-5.19) 
religion_reg 2.931** 3.205** 3.291*** 3.024** 1.315 3.196** 
 (2.89) (3.08) (3.33) (3.02) (0.99) (3.23) 
al_ethnic 1.480      
 (1.38)      
al_language  1.208     
  (1.36)     
fe_cultdiv   1.985+    
   (1.83)    
fe_etfra    1.433   
    (1.52)   
elf     2.652**  
     (2.59)  
numgrps      0.144+ 
      (1.85) 
N 89 87 92 92 69 91 
The t statistic is presented in parentheses; +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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 If, alternatively, the percentage of people stating that God is important (important_god) 
was used to capture religiousness (Table 7.8), coefficients increased slightly and p-
values decreased. The measures for ethnic fractionalisation (al_ethnic, fe_etfra) 
remained insignificant. Both socio-economic development and religiosity had the 
expected effect and were highly significant. 
Table 7.8 Ordered logit estimates 
inform_quint (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
gdp_pc_ppp –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** 
 (–4.30) (–4.68) (–4.87) (–4.77) (–4.78) (–4.54) 
important_god 0.571*** 0.619*** 0.613*** 0.572*** 0.399* 0.626*** 
 (3.63) (3.90) (3.98) (3.67) (2.36) (4.05) 
al_ethnic 1.700      
 (1.61)      
al_language  1.873*     
  (2.17)     
fe_cultdiv   2.213*    
   (2.03)    
fe_etfra    1.449   
    (1.57)   
Elf     2.971**  
     (2.99)  
numgrps      0.172* 
      (2.26) 
N 91 89 93 93 70 92 
The t statistic is presented in parentheses; *p < 0.05, * p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
In a final step, we added the linguistic correlate of individualism to the estimations to 
understand how the three aspects of culture jointly determine the probability of a 
country being in a high-risk group. Table 7.9 shows the estimated coefficients when the 
INFORM-quintiles are jointly explained by socio-economic development, the linguistic 
characteristic of keeping the pronoun, religiosity and the different measures of ethnic or 
linguistic heterogeneity. All coefficients have the expected sign. All measures of 
heterogeneity are strongly significant. However, while nondrop is significant at the 
p < 0.1 level, religiosity, as measured by the proportion of respondents who regularly 
attend religious service, is insignificant.  
If, alternatively, the importance of God (important_god) is used as a measure of 
religiosity (Table 7.10), the coefficients for nondrop are insignificant and those for 
religiosity are significant. If the actual individualism measure (individualism) is employed 
instead of nondrop, individualism is always insignificant and religiosity has a significant 
and positive effect for most estimates, independent of which proxy is being used.  
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 Table 7.9 Ordered logit estimates 
inform_quint (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
gdp_pc_ppp –0.000** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000** –0.000** –0.000** 
 (–2.88) (–3.31) (–3.56) (–3.11) (–3.22) (–3.00) 
Nondrop –1.314+ –1.295+ –1.451* –1.343+ –1.575+ –1.334+ 
 (–1.87) (–1.80) (–2.11) (–1.94) (–1.94) (–1.85) 
religion_reg 0.908 1.434 1.243 1.024 0.966 1.701 
 (0.58) (0.95) (0.86) (0.68) (0.58) (1.18) 
al_ethnic 4.067**      
 (2.65)      
al_language  2.710*     
  (2.10)     
fe_cultdiv   5.186**    
   (3.11)    
fe_etfra    3.719**   
    (2.80)   
elf     3.951**  
     (2.82)  
numgrps      0.230* 
      (2.19) 
N 59 58 62 62 55 61 
The t statistic is presented in parentheses; +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
We conclude that the degree of religiosity and ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity are 
related to climate change risk and resilience beyond their effect on socioeconomic 
development. This is not the case for individualism. Whether or not this relation is causal 
in nature, and how these cultural aspects influence risk and resilience requires further 
research. Some preliminary hypothesis to explain these data are discussed in Section 9. 
Table 7.10 Ordered logit estimates 
inform_quint (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
gdp_pc_ppp –0.000** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000** 
 (–3.01) (–3.53) (–3.62) (–3.32) (–3.29) (–3.17) 
nondrop –0.782 –0.669 –0.897 –0.703 –1.004 –0.734 
 (-1.06) (–0.90) (-–1.21) (–0.95) (–1.21) (–0.97) 
important_god 0.442* 0.552** 0.512** 0.443* 0.528* 0.517** 
 (2.24) (2.84) (2.63) (2.21) (2.42) (2.66) 
al_ethnic 3.455*      
 (2.36)      
al_language  2.526*     
  (2.19)     
fe_cultdiv   4.825**    
   (3.01)    
fe_etfra    2.789*   
    (2.14)   
elf     3.872**  
     (2.99)  
numgrps      0.199+ 
      (1.94) 
N 60 59 63 63 56 62 
The t statistic is presented in parentheses; +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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 8 Robustness checks, alternative measures and results for 
the EU-28 sample 
In this section the robustness of the results obtained in Section 7 for alternative 
specifications are discussed. The extension of the multivariate analysis to the alternative 
measures of risk/resilience are reported. Sub-section 8.3 reports the results for the 
analysis of Sections 5–7, performed on the restricted sample of EU-28 countries. 
8.1 Robustness checks 
The estimations from Section 7 were repeated with four basic modifications.11 Firstly, to 
measure socio-economic development, the Human Development Index (HID) (Jahan, 
2015) was employed instead of per capita GDP. This leaves the results qualitatively 
unchanged. If, however, individualism is included in the specification with all cultural 
categories instead of nondrop, most estimated coefficients for ethnic and linguistic 
heterogeneity become insignificant. Religiosity, however, remains important. 
Secondly, instead of the ordered logit the ordered probit technique was used for 
estimation. Again, there is no qualitative change. In a third specification change, the 
dependent variable was changed: instead of using quintiles of INFORM, deciles were 
used. The use of deciles instead of quintiles resulted in a slight increase in the p-values 
of the estimates for cultural heterogeneity. Most of the coefficients that are significant at 
p < 0.01 for quintiles are significant only at p < 0.1 for deciles. While the quantitative 
results became somewhat weaker, the conclusions do not require modification.  
Finally, the original INFORM score was used as a dependent variable and estimations 
were performed using standard ordinary least squares (OLS). This method uses all the 
information contained in the index. However, problems with endogeneity are excessive 
in this case. If socio-economic development is measured by per capita GDP, the results 
are qualitatively similar to those reported in Section 7 and the conclusion remains 
unchanged. If, instead, the HDI is used, almost all cultural variables become insignificant 
for all specifications. Only the percentage of respondents who find God important in life 
(important_god) shows significant effects in those specifications that include all cultural 
categories.  
It is noteworthy that the use of the HDI considerably reduces the importance of cultural 
heterogeneity and most measures of religiosity. However, the HDI is an element of the 
INFORM index and endogeneity, accordingly, is rampant. The HDI is a composite index 
combining health and long life, knowledge and economic development. The question of 
how the elements of the HDI are related to the risk indictors and to the cultural aspects 
is an interesting one for future analysis.  
 
11 Regression tables can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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 8.2 Multivariate regressions with alternative risk and resilience 
measures  
The regression analysis for the alternative measures of resilience presents a mixed 
picture. With data from the WRI, the effect of the cultural variables vanishes if jointly 
estimated with per capita GDP. For the regressions with all cultural categories, only 
some religious variables show a significant and positive association. In contrast, for the 
ND-GAIN index, the cultural variables have explanatory power also if socio-economic 
development is included in the calculation. For all cultural categories, individualism is not 
a significant factor; most estimates for religiousness re significant, with the expected 
positive correlation, and some of the cultural heterogeneity variables are also significant 
and positively related.  
A different result is obtained if the DARA data are used as dependent variables. While 
individualism and religiosity were not significant when controlling for socio-economic 
development, ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity remained important. This held also true 
when all categories are included simultaneously. When the Global CRI data are 
examined, the inclusion of socio-economic development makes some variables of 
religiousness and cultural diversity significant. The CRI, which is very hazard driven, 
shows a positive, albeit largely insignificant, effect of the examined variables on socio-
economic development.12 Overall, these results strengthen the notion that religiosity and 
to some degree cultural heterogeneity (but not individualism) are related to climate 
change risk and resilience. 
 
8.3 The EU-28 sample 
To understand if and how this analysis is applicable in the European Union context, the 
analytical steps of Sections 5 and 7 were repeated on a sample of EU-28 countries only. 
In this sub-section we provide an overview of the findings.13 The analysis was restricted 
to a cross-section as cultural attributes are slow-changing and no reasonable times-
series data is available. As this analysis was restricted to a cross-section of 28 countries, 
sample size was an issue. 
The individualism variables have significant negative correlations with resilience 
indicators; for religiousness variables, which are all positively correlated, only those 
correlations with the ND-GAIN index (gain2014) are significant. For the variables of 
cultural heterogeneity, some correlation coefficients have a negative sign. The results 
from the WRI index show that those correlations are significant, indicating that more 
ethnically diverse countries in Europe could be more resilient.  
 
12 The positive correlation between hazard exposure and socio-economic development could be 
driven by reporting bias or the fact that relatively more assets are being insured in more 
developed countries. For a discussion, see for example, Neher and Miola (2015). 
13 All tables are available upon request. 
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 Table 8.1 Ordered logit estimates EU-28 sample 
inform_quint (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
gdp_pc_ppp –0.000+ –0.000 –0.000+ –0.000 –0.000* –0.000 
 (–1.86) (–1.24) (–1.84) (–1.59) (–2.20) (–1.48) 
important_god 0.285 0.882* 0.643* 0.634+ 0.803+ 0.914* 
 (0.97) (2.27) (2.01) (1.93) (1.76) (2.37) 
al_ethnic –1.341      
 (–0.54)      
al_religion  6.215*     
  (2.34)     
fe_cultdiv   –3.878    
   (–1.24)    
fe_etfra    –0.845   
    (–0.34)   
elf     6.196  
     (1.50)  
numgrps      0.372 
      (1.15) 
N 27 27 25 25 17 24 
The t statistic is presented in parentheses; +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
Employing multivariate regressions, a picture similar to the one in Table 8.1 emerges for 
all kind of specifications (also with individualism or nondrop included). Individualism and 
ethnic heterogeneity are not significant. The variables for religiosity are significant, 
however, particularly when taken together with the measure of religious heterogeneity 
(al_religious). This positive and significant effect for religiosity (all measures) and 
religious heterogeneity was found in all estimations, including those in which HDI was 
used instead of per capita GDP. We conclude that for the European Union, in contrast to 
the global perspective, religiousness and religious heterogeneity are more important and 
ethnic diversity less important with respect to resilience to climate change.  
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 9 Why does culture relate to risk from and resilience to 
climate change? 
We argue for two basic mechanisms that link cultural characteristics to resilience to 
climate change. Arguably the more important mechanism, on which most attention is 
focused, rests on the argument that culture systematically influences a society’s 
propensity to cooperate and overcome problems of collective action. Both are seen as 
crucial inputs for resilience. 14  The argument is built on a trove of results from the 
published literature, and individualism, religiousness and cultural heterogeneity will each 
be discussed separately. An alternative, but rather general, link from culture to resilience 
is the phenomenon of cultural cognition, which provides a culture-based explanation for 
disagreement about ‘empirical dimensions of public policy questions’ (Kahan and 
Braman, 2015). It is obvious that widespread disregard of climate change within a 
society would reduce efforts to build adaptive capacity, thereby reducing resilience.15  
What aspects of culture determine a society’s propensity to cooperate? 
While the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation are hotly debated in the 
literature (Smith, 2010; Boyd et al., 2011; Gintis et al., 2012; Rand and Nowak, 2013), 
there is widespread agreement that humans’ ability and propensity to cooperate is a 
decisive factor for the success of the species (e.g. Gächter et al., 2010; Roos et al., 
2015). As Simpson and Willer (2015) point out, cooperation can be explained by causes 
internal to the individual (altruism, pro-social preferences) or causes external to the 
individual (social norms, networks and reputation systems). The internal and external 
components are, however, most certainly interdependent (e.g. Fehr and Hoff, 2011). 
Some degree of cooperation is implicit in most aspects of society, and social preferences 
that facilitate cooperation are widespread: Bruhin et al. (2016) measure preferences 
implied by behaviour in experiments and claim that 40% of the population strongly care 
for the payoffs of their fellow humans (strong altruists).16 
In the endeavour to understand human cooperation, the problem of separating the 
effects of culture and institutions arises continuously.17 Some authors identify culture as 
a driver of institutions (Licht et al., 2007; Pryor, 2008; Mathers and Williamson, 2011; 
Maseland, 2013), others identify institutions as a cause of cultural variance (Tabellini, 
2008; Henrich, 2015; Lowes et al., 2015a) and a third view emphasises a co-evolution 
of culture and institutions (Richerson and Henrich, 2009; Greif and Tabellini, 2010, 
2015; Gächter and Schulz, 2016). A review of this literature is provided by Alesina and 
14 A positive relation between social capital, a close correlate of cooperation, and resilience is 
shown by Carter and Maluccio (2003). 
15 For a more detailed account, refer to Kahan (2012), and especially Kahan et al. (2012). 
16  The relation between preferences and cooperative behaviour is itself a tricky question. If 
cooperation implies a trade-off at the individual level between the optimal strategy for the 
individual and the optimal strategy for the collective, altruists are not cooperators in this sense 
since individual and collective optimal behaviour is aligned.  
17 The problems related to the conceptual fuzziness of ‘culture’ have been mentioned repeatedly. 
The concept of institutions faces similar problems. Institutions could refer to governments and 
corporations, specific rules of governance, the rule of law and even social norms. Social norms are 
often regarded as an aspect of culture so that there is a potential conceptual overlap between 
institutions and culture. 
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 Giuliano (2015). A similar notion of circularity emanates from the literature on trust and 
institutions, in which trust is generally perceived as a specific cultural characteristic 
closely linked to cooperation.18  
We now return to the specific cultural characteristics that have been the object of our 
quantitative analysis and related findings from the literature.  
 
9.1 Individualism/collectivism 
There is some evidence that in individualistic societies there are more conditional 
cooperators and, thus, higher levels of cooperation (Hermann et al., 2008). The findings 
of Hermann et al. (2008) are corroborated by so far unpublished experiments by Schulz 
and co-authors, which also show that, in public good games with punishment, played 
across a large number of societies, contribution levels decrease and anti-social 
punishment increases with the level of collectivism.19 At first sight, this is a surprising 
result since, by definition, collectivists put greater emphasis on the collective and thus 
should be more willing to cooperate and give up individual benefit for the benefit of the 
group (as argued by, for example, Wagner, 1995). This line of argument, however, 
neglects the fact that the relevant group for which the collectivist is willing to sacrifice 
individual benefits is of limited size, namely his or her in-group. It is precisely this in-
group bias that reduces the propensity to cooperate in society at large. A similar 
argument is used in what Banfield calls ‘amoral familism’ (Banfield, 1967). 20 In the 
words of Greif in a paper on cultural beliefs:  
“In collectivist societies the social structure is ‘segregated’ in the sense that each 
individual socially and economically interacts mainly with members of a specific 
religious, ethnic, or familial group in which contract enforcement is achieved 
through ‘informal’ economic and social institutions, and members of collectivist 
societies feel involved in the lives of other members of their group. At the same 
time, noncooperation characterizes the relations between members of different 
groups. In individualist societies the social structure is ‘integrated’ in the sense 
that economic transactions are conducted among people from different groups 
and individuals shift frequently from one group to another.” 
(Greif, 1994, p. 913) 
The grammatical category of pronoun drop is strongly related to collectivism; the 
propensity to cooperate should be lower in countries with languages that drop the 
pronoun (Kashima and Kashima, 1998, 2003).  
However, individualism/collectivism and underlying grammatical structures of the 
language do not only affect the propensity to cooperate, but might also directly or 
18 This will be further discussed below. For a literature survey on trust, see Algan and Cahuc 
(2013). 
19 On antisocial punishment, see Hermann et al. (2008). 
20 Experiments have in fact shown that strong family ties inhibit the generalized trust necessary 
for collective cooperation (Ermisch and Gambetta, 2010). 
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 indirectly affect socio-economic and institutional development. Gorodnichenko and 
Roland (2011a, b, 2012) show that individualism is a determinant of long-term economic 
growth. It has also been shown that individualism induces democratisation and improves 
governance (Licht et al., 2007; Davis and Abdurazokzoda, 2015; Gorodnichenko and 
Roland, 2015) while collectivism promotes corruption (Mazar and Aggarwal, 2011). 
As discussed previously, our results indicate that the positive effect of individualism on 
higher levels of resilience vanishes once socio-economic development is taken into 
account. The effect of individualism on development and institutions might be driven by 
the propensity to cooperate. However, the effect of individualism on the propensity to 
cooperate does not directly foster resilience, but is more probably moderated via socio-
economic development. 
 
9.2 Religiousness  
Religiousness is in general associated with pro-social behaviour (e.g. Hoffmann, 2013; 
Preston and Ritter, 2013). Although pro-social behaviour is necessary but not sufficient 
for cooperative behaviour, it is difficult to align our results with our fundamental premise 
that specific cultural aspects affect resilience via their influence on society’s propensity 
to cooperate. In fact, experimental studies have shown that people who are more 
religious are not any more or less cooperative than those who are not (Chuah et al., 
2014, and references therein). What could explain the observation that more religious 
countries are less resilient? 
At the outset it is important to emphasise that religiousness is a complex phenomenon 
that might induce different behaviours in individuals contingent on the intensity of 
religious beliefs, the content of religious beliefs, the difference in religious practices and 
the social context. For example, Preston and Ritter (2013) showed that priming of 
individuals with ‘religion’ directs their pro-social behaviour towards the in-group while 
priming with ‘God’ directs the pro-social behaviour towards the out-group. In addition, 
while it has often been found that people who are more religious prefer lower levels of 
state redistribution of income, Jordan (2014) showed that this effect depends on the 
denomination of the respondents. 
Could there be a similar effect to the one seen for collectivism, namely that more 
religious individuals have a stronger in-group bias? This does not seem to be the case. 
The variable religious fractionalisation (fractionalisation will be discussed in more detail 
below) never showed any statistically significant relation with resilience or vulnerability 
to climate change, even when it interacted with the intensity of religious beliefs. If there 
was in-group bias, the negative effect of in-group-bias on cooperation should increase 
with the number of religious groups in society. 21  What alternative explanations are 
there? 
21 Chuah et al. (2014, 2015) claim that religious similarity increases trust and cooperation while 
the knowledge of religious difference does not reduce it. 
27 
 
                                          
 Barro and McCleary (2003) found a differential effect of religious beliefs and religious 
practices. While religious beliefs were positively associated with economic growth, an 
increase in religious activities, such as church attendance, ceteris paribus had a negative 
correlation with growth. The authors hypothesise that religious beliefs are an output of 
the religion sector while church attendance is an input in the religion sector so that ‘for 
given beliefs, higher church attendance signifies more resources used up the religious 
sector’ (Barro and McCleary, 2003, p. 760).  
Bénabou et al. (2015) constructed a political economy model to analyse the interplay 
between science, religion and growth. Their model results in three possible long-term 
outcomes (1) a secularised society with declining religiosity and high levels of 
innovation, taxation and secular public spending; (2) a theocratic society with knowledge 
stagnation, high taxes and high subsidies to the religious sector; and (3) an 
intermediary regime in which inequality can create interesting effects. More importantly 
for the present context, the authors uncovered a novel empirical regularity, namely that 
societies that are more religious have significantly lower levels of innovation. The model 
does not explicitly assume that the religious sector is conservative and defies innovation, 
but simply assumes that there are costs of adaptation for the religion to adapt to new 
scientific discoveries. Research evaluating personality traits and values has in fact 
established that individuals who are more religious tend to be more conservative and 
have a dislike for new things (Saroglou et al., 2004). 
The findings of Bénabou et al. (2015) and Barro and McCleary (2003) could provide one 
explanation for why we observe a negative statistical relation between religiousness and 
resilience, namely that lower levels of innovation coupled with comparatively more 
inputs into the religious sector in societies that are more religious might result in 
comparatively lower levels of adaptive capacity, thus increasing vulnerability and 
reducing resilience. On an individual level, conservatism and a dislike for new things 
might, in the vein of cultural cognition, reduce individuals’ acceptance of scientific 
forecasts and perceptions of CC and, thus, reduce individual and collective willingness to 
engage in adaptive activities with respect to those events, resulting in lower levels of 
adaptive capacity and less resilience as a consequence. 
 
9.3 Fractionalisation 
The third cultural category under review is a structural category in the sense that all 
measures capture structural characteristics of society. We interchangeably call this 
aspect of culture fractionalisation, diversity or heterogeneity with respect to ethnicity, 
language and religion, respectively. Sometimes we also refer to this category as cultural 
heterogeneity, which is, however, not strictly correct as cultural and ethnic 
heterogeneity are not the same thing (Desmet et al., 2015).22 We first look to see if the 
literature on cultural and ethnic heterogeneity supports our central hypothesis that 
culture affects resilience by way of influencing society’s propensity to cooperate. Often, 
22 The literature on ethnic heterogeneity sometime further differentiates between fragmentation, 
polarisation and segregation of ethnic groups. These complexities were not considered in the 
present context.  
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 this link is established not directly but by way of trust or social capital, which are 
intimately linked to cooperation (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2004; Gächter et al., 2004; 
Thöni, 2015). We will then consider alternative transmission mechanisms linking 
fractionalisation to resilience. 
There is a literature that establishes a link between ethnic and cultural heterogeneity 
and lower levels of trust, cooperation and reduced provisions of public goods. Alesina et 
al. (1999) showed that in US cities the supply of productive public goods decreased with 
an increase in ethnic fragmentation. Habyarimana et al. (2007) undertook experiments 
in Africa that showed that ethnic diversity undermines the provision of public goods. The 
authors also proposed an explanation as to why it does. 
A number of contributions have established that ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity 
are detrimental to generalised (and potentially personal) trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2000; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Leigh, 2006; Dincer, 2011; Algan and Cahuc, 
2013). Trust and social capital23 in turn have a well-established and intimate link to 
cooperation (e.g. Pretty, 2003; Carpenter et al., 2004; Gächter et al., 2004, 2010; Thöni 
et al., 2012; Thöni, 2015). This link is so ingrained that trust and cooperation are often 
mentioned together as if they are similar concepts (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2004). Thöni et 
al. (2012) argue that survey questions on trust are a proxy for individual ‘preferences for 
cooperation’.  
Why might the existence of multiple ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups hamper the 
overall propensity to cooperate? Several possible explanations are identified in the 
literature; in-group bias based on social identity and the observability of behaviour are 
probably the two more important explanations, but equity concerns or social 
connectedness could also play a role. In the latter case, experiments have shown that in 
smaller groups and in groups where players had pre-game interaction, better 
coordination and cooperation outcomes could be achieved (Attanasi et al., 2016). Social 
distance has also been shown to decrease trust levels (Binzel and Fehr, 2013). With 
respect to equity concerns, Gangadharan et al. (2015) found that more heterogeneous 
populations achieve less efficient outcomes because, in such populations, some 
efficiency is traded for more equitable outcomes.  
Individuals identify with groups along the lines of ethnicity, language and culture. 
Rustagi and Veronesi (2016) showed that individuals’ social identity is paramount for 
their propensity to cooperate. The phenomenon that ethnic identity often results in an 
in-group preference that necessarily sets back the out-group has been discussed, for 
example by Lowes et al. (2015b). A special form of ethnic in-group bias is ethnic 
favouritism, i.e. political leaders favour their own ethnic group. This effect is shown to 
have robust economic impacts (De Luca et al., 2015). Finally, a number of authors have 
established peer effects in the sense that cooperative acts by individuals that are 
observable to others in the group increase reciprocity and thus improve overall levels of 
cooperation (Rand et al., 2014; Dimant, 2015; Kraft-Todd et al., 2015). 
23 Social capital is a broader concept than trust. However, trust is the most commonly used proxy 
variable to measure social capital. 
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 In addition, there are a number of alternative mechanisms not directly related to trust 
and cooperation that could also create a negative association between ethnic and 
cultural fragmentation and the resilience to climate change. Ethnic and linguistic 
cleavages are said to negatively impact economic growth (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 
1997; Alesina et al., 2003; Desmet et al., 2016).24 Further, the negative effect of ethnic 
and cultural heterogeneity on trust and social capital could lead to a reduction in 
institutional quality (Alesina et al., 2003; Tabellini, 2008; Brondizio et al., 2009; 
Bjørnskov, 2010; Nannicini et al., 2013), increase corruption (Dincer, 2008; Graeff and 
Svendsen, 2013; Graf Lambsdorff, 2015) and decrease economic growth (Algan and 
Cahuc, 2013; Bjørnskov and Méon, 2013; Serritzlew et al., 2014).  
 
  
24 These findings are questioned by Arcand et al. (2000) and Arcand and Grin (2013). 
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 10 Conclusion 
This paper analyses the statistical relation between a number of a country’s cultural 
attributes and measures of risk of susceptibility to CC. Assuming that CC risk and 
vulnerability are closely linked to resilience to CC, this analysis ultimately helps to shed 
some light on cultural determinants of resilience. 
Individualism/collectivism, religiousness and cultural heterogeneity are the cultural 
attributes analysed. Variables quantifying those aspects of culture are consistently 
correlated with standard risk and vulnerability measures. Further inquiry reveals that 
religiousness, and to a lesser degree cultural heterogeneity, contribute to explaining 
national differences in resilience. We hypothesise that culture influences trust and a 
society’s propensity to cooperate, which are important inputs for resilience. 
What conclusions can be drawn for policy formulation? It could be argued that none of 
the cultural attributes analysed in this study should directly influence policy efforts. 
Although policy and the cultural attributes studied in this report have been combined in 
the past (historic secularisation in Europe was, to a considerable degree, state driven; 
forceful integration of ethnic minorities in authoritarian regimes; ethnic divides that were 
used by elites in a Machiavellian sense), such policies would probably violate human 
rights. However, it can be recommended that in conditions of intense religiousness of the 
population and high levels of ethnic or linguistic fractionalisation, extra effort, attention 
and provision of additional resources will be necessary to build better institutions and 
improve communication and trust between different societal groups.  
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 APPENDIX A 
Table A1. Construction of religiousness variables (WVS and EVS) 
Frequency of attending religious services 
Survey item: Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you 
attend religious services these days? 
religion_reg 1 More than once a week  
2 Once a week  
3 Once a month 
religion_some 4 Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days  
5 Other specific holy days  
6 Once a year 
religion_never 7 Less often  
8 Never/practically never 
Meaning: The variable measures the percentage of respondents who attend religious 
services regularly, sometimes or never. 
Construction: Indicator variable indicates if respondent chose respective response 
category, these indicator variables are then averaged across country-wave observations 
and then averaged across all available survey waves. 
Frequency of praying25 
Survey item: How often do you pray to God outside religious services? Would you say ... 
pray_reg 1 Every day (Often) 
2 More than once a week 
3 Once a week (Sometimes) 
pray_some 4 At least once a month (Hardly ever) 
5 Several times a year (Only in times of crisis) 
6 Less often 
pray_never 7 Never 
Meaning: Percentage of respondents who pray regularly, sometimes or never outside 
religious services. 
Construction: Indicator variable indicates if respondent chose response category; these 
indicator variables are then averaged across country-wave observations and then 
averaged across all available survey waves. 
Belief in God 
Survey item: Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?  
belief_god 0 No, 1 Yes 
Meaning: Percentage of respondents who state that they believe in god. 
Construction: Responses averaged across country-wave observations and then averaged 
across all available survey waves. 
Importance of God 
Survey item: How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate — 10 
means very important and 1 means not at all important.  
important_god 1 not at all important … 10 very important  
Meaning: Higher values indicate that respondents, on average, find God more important 
25 Between waves, the wording of the response categories was changed. The responses in brackets 
give the alternative wordings used. 
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 in their lives.  
Construction: Responses averaged across country-wave observations and then averaged 
across all available survey waves 
 
Table A2. Description of variables for cultural and ethnic heterogeneity 
Variable Source Description 
al_ethnic (1) 
‘Ethnic fractionalization: The definition of ethnicity involves a 
combination of racial and linguistic characteristics. The result is a 
higher degree of fractionalization than the commonly used ELF-
index (see el_elf60) in for example Latin America, where people 
of many races speak the same language.’ (Teorell et al., 2016) 
al_language (1) 
‘Linguistic fractionalization: Reflects probability that two randomly 
selected people from a given country will not belong to the same 
linguistic group. The higher the number, the more fractionalized 
society.’ (Teorell et al., 2016) 
al_religion (1) 
‘Religious fractionalization: Reflects probability that two randomly 
selected people from a given country will not belong to the same 
religious group. The higher the number, the more fractionalized 
society.’ (Teorell et al., 2016) 
fe_etfra (1) 
‘Ethnic fractionalization: Restricting attention to groups that had 
at least 1 percent of country population in the 1990s, Fearon 
identifies 822 ethnic and ethnoreligious groups in 160 countries. 
This variable reflects the probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will belong to different such groups. 
The variable thus ranges from 0 (perfectly homogeneous) to 1 
(highly fragmented).’ (Teorell et al., 2016) 
fe_cultdiv (1) 
‘Cultural diversity: This measure modifies fractionalization 
(fe_etfra) so as to take some account of cultural distances 
between groups, measured as the structural distance between 
languages spoken by different groups in a country. If the groups 
in a country speak structurally unrelated languages, their cultural 
diversity index will be the same as their level of ethnic 
fractionalization (fe_etfra). The more similar are the languages 
spoken by different ethnic groups, however, the more will this 
measure be reduced below the level of ethnic fractionalization for 
that country.’  
numgrps (2) Number of groups listed in a country (Fearon, 2003, dataset) 
elf (2) 
‘Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Measures probability that two 
randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to 
the same ethnolinguistic group. Original source: Atlas Narodov 
Mira (1964).’ (Teorell et al., 2016) 
Sources:  
(1) Quality of Government Database (http://qog.pol.gu.se/data, Teorell et al., 2016).  
(2) Fearon, 2003 (http://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/publicdata/publicdata.html). 
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 Table A3. Components and levels of the INFORM index 
 Level 5 Level 4 Level 3 
Level 
2 
1 
Physical exposure to earthquake MMI VI 
(absolute) 
Earthquake 
Natural 
H
az
ar
d
 a
n
d
 e
xp
os
u
re
 
2 
Physical exposure to earthquake MMI VI 
(relative) 
3 
Physical exposure to earthquake MMI 
VIII (absolute) 
4 
Physical exposure to earthquake MMI 
VIII (relative) 
5 
Physical exposure to tsunamis 
(absolute)  Tsunami 
6 Physical exposure to tsunamis (relative) 
7 Physical exposure to flood (absolute)  
Flood 
8 Physical exposure to flood (relative) 
9 
Physical exposure to surge from tropical 
cyclone (absolute) 
Tropical cyclone 
10 
Physical exposure to surge from tropical 
cyclone (relative) 
11 
Physical exposure to tropical cyclone of 
SS 1 (absolute) 
12 
Physical exposure to tropical cyclone of 
SS 1 (relative) 
13 
Physical exposure to tropical cyclone of 
SS 3 (absolute) 
14 
Physical exposure to tropical cyclone of 
SS 3 (relative) 
15 People affected by droughts (absolute) 
Drought 
16 People affected by droughts (relative) 
17 Frequency of drought events 
18 Agriculture drought probability 
19 GCRI violent internal conflict probability 
Projected conflict 
risk 
Human 
20 
GCRI high violent internal conflict 
probability 
21 Current national power conflict intensity Current conflict 
intensity 22 Current subnational conflict intensity 
23 Human development index Poverty and 
development 
Socio-
economic 
vulnerability 
V
u
ln
er
ab
ili
ty
 
24 Multidimensional poverty index 
25 Gender inequality index 
Inequality 
26 Gini coefficient 
27 Public aid per capita 
Aid dependency 
28 Net ODA Received (% of GNI) 
29 Total persons of concern (absolute) 
Uprooted people 
Vulnerable 
groups 
30 Total persons of concern (relative) 
31 Children underweight Other vulnerable 
groups, children 
under-5 32 Child mortality 
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 33 Prevalence of HIV-AIDS above 15 years Other vulnerable 
groups, health 
conditions 
34 Tuberculosis prevalence 
35 Malaria mortality rate 
36 
Relative number of affected population 
by natural disasters in the last three 
years 
Other vulnerable 
groups, recent 
shocks 
37 Prevalence of undernourishment 
Other vulnerable 
groups, food 
security 
38 Average dietary supply adequacy 
39 Domestic food price level index 
40 Domestic food price volatility index 
41 Hyogo framework for action 
DRR 
implementation 
Institutional 
La
ck
 o
f 
co
p
in
g
 c
ap
ac
it
y 
42 Government effectiveness 
Governance 
43 Corruption perception index 
44 Access to electricity (% of population) 
Communication 
Infrastructure 
45 Internet users (per 100 people) 
46 
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 
people) 
47 Adult literacy rate 
48 
Road density (km of road per 100 km2 
of land area) 
Physical 
connectivity 
49 
Access to improved water source (% of 
population with access) 
50 
Access to improved sanitation facilities 
(% of pop with access) 
51 Physicians density 
Access to health 
system 
52 Health expenditure per capita 
53 Measles immunisation coverage 
Source: De Groeve et al., (2015) p. A-5. (DRR, disaster risk reduction; GCRI, global conflict risk index; GNI, 
gross national income; MMI, modified Mercalli intensity scale; ODA, overseas development assistance; SS 1, 
Saffir–Simpson category 1; SS 3, Saffir–Simpson category 3.)  
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